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FEDERAL CLAIMS COURT
Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 45 Fed. CI. 154
(1999) (holding that sophisticated developer's investment-backed
expectations for its property were not reasonable due to developer's actual
knowledge of the Clean Water Act and the possible existence of non-tidal
wetlands on the property and the nature of the Army Corps of Engineers
action was not so unreasonable as to constitute a compensable taking).
Plaintiff, Broadwater Farms Joint Venture ("Broadwater Farms"), was
a general partnership that bought and prepared unimproved land for
residential developers. It contracted out for roads, electrical lines, storm
drains, and sewage removal systems for residential use.
In 1987,
Broadwater Farms purchased property known as Spyglass, consisting of
fifty-one lots near the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area of Anne Arundel
County, Maryland. The County zoned the Area for residential use ten
years prior to the Broadwater Farms' purchase. When Broadwater Farms
had finished eight-five percent of the work on the development, an
employee from the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") enforcement
section surveyed the property. The Corps determined that much of the
development violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
The Corps
determined that the Spyglass area consisted of non-tidal wetlands and
ordered Broadwater Farms to cease and desist the development.
Broadwater Farms asserted that they acted consistently with the permits
and plans for residential development approved by the County. While the
Corps allowed construction to continue in some areas, Broadwater Farms
received a letter from the Corps ordering it to restore eleven lots "to the
maximum extent possible."
The trial court determined that the alleged taking by the government
represented a mere diminution in the property's value and did not
constitute a compensable taking. The appellate court agreed that a
categorical taking did not occur. It remanded the case to the trial court to
consider whether a categorical taking occurred. On remand, the trial court
considered the extent to which the government regulation interfered with
the Broadwater Farms' investment-backed expectations and the character of
the government action.
On remand, first, the trial court determined that the buyer's reasonable
expectations had to be discounted when a regulatory scheme was in place.
Here, Broadwater Farms had no reasonable investment-backed expectation
for its planned development because it had actual and constructive
knowledge of the CWA's regulatory scheme. Broadwater Farms was
familiar with the CWA's potential effects before it developed its property.
Broadwater Farms and its representatives even dealt with the CWA's
mandates on three previous occasions. In addition, Broadwater Farms'
engineer informed it that non-tidal wetlands may exist and advised
Broadwater Farms that the wetlands could affect development. Thus,
Broadwater Farms, a sophisticated developer, took a calculated risk in
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developing the property and could not reasonably have expected
unencumbered development.
Second, the court concluded that government's action was not
improper. Broadwater Farms argued that the regulation enforced by the
Corps left Broadwater Farms without compensation. It argued that the
Corps acted unreasonably, irresponsibly, and was unwilling to
compromise.
The court noted that to the extent the Corps seemed
unwilling to compromise, it was merely enforcing a regulation as ordered
by Congress. Thus, the action that left Broadwater Farms without a permit
to develop did not constitute a compensable taking. The Court entered
judgment for the government.
M. Elizabeth Lokey
Lakewood Assocs. v. United States, 45 Fed. C1. 320 (1999) (holding
Lakewood's regulatory taking claim not ripe).
Lakewood Associates ("Lakewood") purchased unimproved real estate
known as the Elbow Lake Property and the Boy Scout Tract around 1987
and 1988, respectively. Lakewood planned to use the properties for
residential development.
At the time of purchase, Lakewood had
knowledge that both properties contained wetlands. In 1991, pursuant to
the Clean Water Act, Lakewood submitted a joint application for an
individual section 404 permit to the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") and the Virginia Marine Resources Commission
("VMRC"). Lakewood noted in its application that practicable alternative
sites existed but did not evaluate them.
At the time of the submission of the application, the permit granting
system provided for: (1) avoiding impacts to wetlands to the extent
possible; (2) minimizing them to the extent appropriate and practicable;
and (3) compensating for the creation, restoration, and/or preservation of
other wetlands. Lakewood did not offer mitigation packages for the
wetland impacts its joint application proposed. After submission of the
application, the Virginia State Water Control Board, the Fish and Wildlife
Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency all voiced concern to
the Corps that before making a decision, more information was needed
from Lakewood, including a detailed alternatives analysis and further
environmental information on the wetlands impacted. The Corps sent a
letter to Lakewood in April 1991 requesting further documentation
regarding these concerns.
Lakewood failed to respond with the
information and in September 1991, the Corps closed the permit file. In
1992, Lakewood performed a wetlands delineation that the Corps
confirmed in 1993. In 1996, Lakewood asked the Corps to extend the
1993 delineation to 1998, to which it agreed.
Then, in 1997, Lakewood filed a compliant alleging a taking of its
property occurred in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The government
asserted that since Lakewood failed to fully participate in the available
administrative permit process, the issue was not ripe for decision.

